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THE TREATY POWER AND FAMILY LAW 
Jerome]. Curtis, Jr.* 
Several commentators have urged the treaty power as the basis for 
federal promulgation of uniform domestic relations laws. Professor 
Curtis in this Article analyzes the limitations on the treaty power in 
the area of domestic relations. It is the position of Professor Curtis that 
limitations imposed by the tenth amendment~ as well as those inherent 
in the constitutional grant of the treaty power~ itself~ preclude any fed-
eral preemption in this area. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE promulgation and enforcement of laws regulating the family have long been considered to be the exclusive concern of the in-
dividual states.1 With the exception of the restrictions imposed by the 
fourteenth amendment, 2 the federal government has never assumed 
affirmative responsibilities over such matters.a Rather, each state has 
• Assistant Professor of Law, l\farshall·Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1964: J.D., Uni\·ersity of California, 
Hastings College of Law, 1967: LLM., University of Virginia, 1972. Member of the C:ili· 
fornia and Virginia Bars. 
1 In explaining the aflirm.ative vote of the United States in support of the United 
Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 1\f.ani:lge and Rcgistta· 
tion of Marriages, the United States' representative said: 
In my country under our Constitution, marriage traditionally h:ls been a subject 
within the competence of the respective state governments. Legislation in force in 
our varions state jurisdictions is in conformity with the principles of the M:utiage 
Convention •••• In view of our Constitutional system my Go\·emment, in consider· 
ing ratification of the Convention, will do so with the understanding that the rati.fi· 
cation by the United States will be regarded as constituting a recognition and not 
an impairment of the constitutional rights of the respective states of the United 
States to regulate marriages within their jurisdictions. 
U.N. Doc. AJPV 1167, at 33·35 (1962). This is reproduced in Schwelb, Marriage and Hu-
man Rights, 12 AM. J. Com>. L 337, 858 (1963). 
2 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 871 (1971) (holding the imposition of court 
costs upon indigents seeking divorce in state courts unconstitutional): Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state statute barring an illegitimate child 
from xecovering for the wrongful death of his mother when legitimate children were 
permitted to recover); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (holding state miscegenation 
statute unconstitutional). 
3 Federal courts have even made an exception to the di\•ersity jurisdiction statute. 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), and have denied di,•ersity jurisdiction O\'er domestic relations cases. 
This exception was first developed when the diversity statute granted jurisdiction of 
"suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity." Act of 1\larch 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 
36 Stat. 1091. It was thought that domestic relations cases, being matters which would 
have been heard in the ecclesiastical courts, did not .fit this description. C. Wrucur, FED-
ERAL CoURTS § 25, at 84 (2d ed. 1970). The 1948 Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
[55] 
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been left free to determine the conditions under which persons within 
its borders may marry, divorce, adopt children, or perform any other 
646, § 1332, 62 Stat. 930, substituted the term "civil action" for the phrase used in the 
older statute, but the exception has persisted. Today the exception may be more ra· 
tionally defended on the ground that this is an area of the law in which states have an 
especially strong interest and great competence in dealing. 
The exception originated in dictum in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) li82, li81 
(1859). There the Court held that a wife could sue on the basis of diversity in a federal 
court in Wisconsin to enforce the decree of a New York state court that granted her a 
divorce and alimony; but it added: 
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the 
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding 
in chancery or as an incident to a divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board. 
Id. In another sweeping statement the Supreme Court later said, "the whole subject o£ 
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. li86, 593·91 
(1890). For another early statement of the states' exclusive jurisdiction over domestic rc· 
lations cases, see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 90 (1888) (stating marriage is an institution 
of society, regulated and controlled by public authority and divorce statutes were within 
the competency of state legislatures). 
Thus, the federal courts have not entertained actions involving questions of matrl· 
monial status and have also not heard "domestic relations" cases involving only property 
rights. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) (state court had jurisdlc· 
tion of an action for divorce against the consul of a foreign country though normally 
federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1351 have exclusive jurisdiction of actions against con· 
suls); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960) (where wife had not obtained entry 
of judgment by New York courts for accrued and unpaid separation decree installments, 
federal court was not required to give full faith and credit to decree and lacked juris· 
diction to enforce payments); Ostrom v. Ostrom, 231 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955) (no power 
for federal court to compel husband to comply with terms of interlocutory divorce de· 
cree entered by California state court); Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389 r,:.v .D. Pa. 1971) 
(divorce action by Pennsylvania resident against Pennsylvania resident not properly re· 
movable to federal court); Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754 (D. Colo. 1965) (case not 
removable to federal court where plaintiff sought divorce, alimony and declaratory and 
injunctive relief relating to realty); Bercovitch v. Tanburn, 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952) (no federal court jurisdiction for Canadian mother·in·law to recover money ex· 
pended for necessities allegedly provided to defendant's wife); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. 
Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa 1951) (no federal court jurisdiction to revoke separation agreement 
entered into by parties as husband and wife). 
The federal courts have also refused to hear child custody cases. E.g., In re Burrus, 136 
U.S. 586, 593·94 (1890) (federal court order granting habeas corpus to obtain custody of a 
child was absolutely void and could be disregarded with impunity). Buechold v. Ortiz, 
401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (no jurisdiction of case involving paternity and child sup• 
port); In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1967) (action by husband seeking ndop• 
tion under Louisiana statutes of wife's two minor children born of prior marriage was 
not removable to federal court on ground of diversity of citizenship); Drandtschcit v. 
Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
in action by foreign citizen against citizen of California to establish paternity and to 
provide support for an illegitimate child). 
One of the few instances of affirmative federal legislation in family law matters is 22 
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essentially familial act. Thus, while a citizen of Nevada may be per-
mitted a divorce upon the shm'ling of incompatibility;' another state 
may provide much more restrictive grounds.11 However, several com-
mentators,6 who desire uniform domestic relations laws, have proposed 
the treaty power7 as a way to preempt the area; and they point to the 
participation of the United States in international efforts to formulate 
uniform domestic relations laws.8 This Article examines the attempts 
to involve the United States in these efforts and reviews the constitu-
tional bases for the proposed involvement. 
II. POTENTIAL 0BUGATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 
The United States Constitution makes federal statutes and treaties 
the supreme law of the land insofar as they comport with the require-
ments of the Constitution itsel£.9 Accordingly, under the supremacy 
U.S.C. § 1172 (1970), which authorizes United States' consuls abroad to perform IIW'riages 
if the parties are competent to marry under the laws of the District of Columbia. The 
constitutionality of this statute apparently has never been tested. 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1968); accord, e.g., .ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.110 (1962); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961). 
5 New York, for example. limited the grounds for divorce to adultery until 1966 when 
the legislature began to increase the number of grounds. Compare N.Y. Do!J. REI.. LAw 
§ 170 (MdGnney 1964) with N.Y. Do:r.r. REI.. LAw § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1972). :hfass:t-
chusetts limits the grounds for divorce to adultery, utter desertion for two consecutive 
years, impotency, gross and confirmed habits of intoxication caused by \'Oluntary use of 
liquor or drugs, cruel and abusive treatment, and gross or wanton and cruel .f:illure to 
provide support. MAss. GEN. LAws .ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (1972). For a statute listing twcl\·e 
common grounds for divorce, see GA. CoDE ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1971). 
6 E.g., Dorsey, Subject-Matter Limitations on the Treaty Power, 4 ll.'T'L LAw. 209 (1970); 
Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L REV. 
1012 (1968); Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law .Makers: Tile Law of tile Land and 
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L REV. 903 (1959); Mosler, Tile Protection of Human 
Rights by International Legal Procedures, 52 GEO. LJ. 800 (1964): Nadclmann, Tile 
United States joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 30 LAw 8: CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 291 (1965). 
7 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, ci. 2 provides: "He [the President] shall ha\·e Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to m:lke Treaties, pro\'ided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur." 
s See Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra 
note 6; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: Tile Law of tile Land and 
Foreign Relations, supra note 6. 
9 U.S. CoNsr. art. VI provides in part: "This Constitution, and the I.:J.ws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties m:1de, or which shall 
be made. under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme I.:J.w of the 
Land." Since this language does not indicate directly that treaties must conform with 
the Constitution while statutes are explicitly required to do so, one might argue that 
there are no constitutional limitations upon the treaty power. The view that treaties arc 
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clause, a lawful exercise of the treaty power by the federal government 
will vitiate any state law in conflict with the treaty.10 In view of the su~ 
premacy of treaties and of the fact that the potential machinery already 
exists within the international community for fashioning changes in 
family laws, it is not surprising that many scholars have advanced the 
treaty power as the appropriate vehicle for imposing federal standards 
upon state family laws. The Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, which has been functioning for seventy-nine years, currently in· 
eludes the United States among its twenty-three member nations.11 The 
not subject to the same constitutional limitations as are statutes finds support in the 
supremacy clause itself, and in an ambiguous suggestion by Justice Holmes in Missouri 
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Justice Holmes said: 
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of 
the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the author· 
ity of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United 
States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. 
Id. Fortunately, some doubt has been cast on the propriety of such an interpretation in 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Justice Black, speaking for the Court, noted by way of 
dicta that treaties, like laws, must be made "in pursuance of" the Constitution and that 
no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any 
other branch of the Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitu· 
tion •••• There is nothing in this language [the supremacy clause] which intimates 
that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the 
provisions of the Constitution . 
• • • The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches 
of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the 
Executive and the Senate combined. 
Id. at 16-17. 
Perhaps the best known statement of the implied limitation on the treaty power is 
that made by Justice Field in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890): 
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by 
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the govern· 
ment or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government it-
self and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to 
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the govern· 
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of 
the latter, without its consent •••• But with these exceptions, it is not percclved 
that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter 
which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country. 
Id. at 267. 
10 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Geofroy v. Riggs, 183 U.S. 258 (1890); 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
11 Statute on the Hague Conference of Private International Law, July 15, 1955, 220 
U.N.T.S. 121. The Hague Conference, which met for the first time in 1898 as a result of 
an initiative of the government of the Netherlands, was transformed into a permanent 
institution through a charter drawn up at the Seventh Session of the Conference in 1951. 
The Charter entered into force on July 15, 1955. In accordance with article 2 thereof, ad· 
mission to membership becomes definitive upon acceptance of the Charter by the State 
concerned. 
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avo1ved objective of the Conference is to foster the unification of the 
rules of private intemationallaw.12 Characteristic of its efforts in the 
family law field are its various international conventions on adoptions, 
divorce, -marital separations, and annulments.13 
A. Convention on Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees 
One development in the Hague Conference which might pose a 
threat to the hegemony of the domestic relations powers of the Ameri-
can states is the Conference's Convention on Recognition of Foreign 
Divorce Decrees which was approved at its 1968 meeting.u This Con-
vention would require ratifying nations to recognize and enforce the 
divorce and separation decrees of other nations111 even in those instances 
where no grounds for divorce or separation exist under the law of the 
reviewing forum or where the choice of law rules of the reviewing fo-
rum would otherwise require that the judgment be ignored. In effect, 
the Convention would enact a full faith and credit rule for the interna-
tional community. 
It is elementary American constitutional law that full faith and 
credit attaches only to the judgments of sister states, and then only if 
the rendering forum had jurisdiction.16 There is nothing in the United 
_ l2 Id. at 123. Article 1 of the Charter of the Hague Conference on Internation:ll L:iw 
provides that the Conference will "work for the progressive unifiCltion of the rules of 
private international law." 
13 See 52 DEP'T SrATE BULL. 1339, at 265 (1965). The agenda for the Tenth Session of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law listed she major items, four of l'lhich 
concerned draft conventions on the following subjects: (1) recognition and enforcement 
of foreigu judgments; (2) international adoption of children; (3) service abro:~d of judici:ll 
and extrajudicial documents; (4) agreements on the choice of court. The fifth major item 
dealt with an exploratory questionnaire on status judgments im·olving dh·orce, legal 
sepaxation, and annulment of marriage. The shcth major item ll':lS a request for topics 
to comprise the agenda of future sessions of the Hague Conference. 
14 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Sep:~rations (19GS). 
This convention is reproduced in 1\!ehren &: Nadelmann, The Hague Conference Conven-
tion of June I, 1970 on Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 5 F.ur. LQ. 303, 309·18 
(1971). 
15 Article 2 provides in part: "Such divorces and legal sep:~rations sh:lll be recognized 
in .all other Contracting States, subject to the remaining terms of this Com·ention •••• " 
Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Sep:~rations, art. 2; l\fehren 
&: Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 309. 
16 The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § I, as in· 
terpreted by the Supreme Court determines the conditions under which the decrees Of 
the courts of one state are to be recognized in other states. The Supreme Court has ar· 
rived at the doctrine that full faith and credit will be given di\·orce decrees only if one 
of the parties to the action was domiciled at the tinte of the divorce in the state where 
the divorce was granted. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 {1945). See gen-
erally .Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d '180 (2d Cir. 
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States system which compels a state to enforce a judgment obtained in 
a foreign country-not even where the foreign court possessed jurisdic· 
tion. Yet, if the United States were to ratify the Convention and de· 
clare that the Convention extends to all its legal systems,17 the federal 
government would have assured the world community that the states 
could and would be compelled to enforce foreign judgments. This as· 
sertion of plenary power by the federal government would constitute a 
marked deviation from the traditional federal role of deference to state 
autonomy in certain matters. While this novel use of the treaty power 
is not without its advocates,l8 thus far the United States has been un· 
willing to depart from the traditional viewpoint.10 
B. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages 
Perhaps the most innovative proposal to emanate from the Hague 
Conference is the United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.20 This Con· 
vention was opened for signature by the United Nations in 1962, and 
although the Convention has not yet been ratified by the Senate, the 
United States is a signatory.21 
1962); Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019 (1962); Kessler v. Fauquier Nat'l Dank, 
195 Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440 (1954). 
17 Article 23 of the Convention provides that if a "Contracting State has more than 
one legal system in matters of divorce or legal separation, it may, at the time of signa· 
ture, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all its legal 
systems or only to one or more of them •••• " Hague Convention on the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separations, art. 23; Mehren &: Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 811), 
Thus the Convention does defer somewhat to federal systems. This provision, however, 
does not address itself to the question of whether the United States has the power under 
its Constitution to prescribe family laws for the states under the treaty power. Two 
writers have suggested that the United States has the power to negotiate in t11e interna· 
tiona! community for the recognition of American divorce decrees but perhaps lacks the 
power to compel the states to recognize the decrees of foreign nations. Mehren &: Nadel· 
mann, supra note 14, at 308. See also 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 797 (1965). 
18 See note 6 supra. 
19 The United States representative to the Conference observed that the United States 
lacked the constitutional authority to compel adherence to a related convention by the 
states. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Xlth Session of the Hague Conferer~cc 011 
Private International Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 787·900 (1969). For a similar 
observation by the United States representative to the United Nations Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962), 
see note 1 supra. 
20 United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages (1962) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Convention on Marriage). 
This convention is reproduced in Schwelb, supra note 1, at 382·88. 
21 Schwelb, supra note 1, at 337. Presently international law recognizes that treaties 
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The principal theme of the Convention is harmless on its surface, 
but beneath its apparent simplicity lurks a direct assault upon tradi-
tional American jurisprudence. Article 1(1) furnishes an apt example 
of this latent danger. It requires a public affirmation of the free and 
open consent of the parties prior to the marriage.:!!! One colorful ex-
ample of the potential conflict betw·een the domestic law of the states 
and the dictates of this Convention is the case of the "shotgun wed-
ding."23 The general American view of such marriages, except for 
those few instances where the groom is literally marched to the altar at 
the end of a gun barrel, is that the groom has freely and fully consented 
to the marriage.24 Thus, the coercion, however great its lack of subtlety, 
become binding not upon the signature of the diplomatic agents 'Yho negotiated them 
but upon the subsequent exchange of ratifications by the go\'ernments of the nations 
which are parties to the treaty. Prior to the development of modern constitutional gov-
ernments it was held that agents delegated to negotiate a treaty must have full power to 
bind the state. Under a monarchy this ·was not a difficult hurdle, since the monarch was 
the ultimate authority of domestic law and his authorization of the agent was thc:rdorc 
conclusive. One other reason for the necessity of an immediate binding c:ffect on states 
upon the signing of an agreement by a diplomatic agent '\'as the relath·cly slow speed of 
communications. Only in the case of acts of bad faith by the authorized agent could the 
treaty be repudiated by the governments which had signed it. C. F.ENWJCA, It\T.ERl'MTJONAL 
LAw 434 (3d ed. 1948). 
22 Article 1(1) reads: 
No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both 
parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in 
the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage of witnesses, as 
prescribed by law. 
U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 1(1); Schwelb, .supra note 1, at 383. Cf. The American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969). This Convention is reproduced in 9 INr'L L.EcAI. 
MATERIALS 99 (1970). Several members of the Organization of American States, not includ· 
ing the United States, are signatories of this Convention. The American Com·ention 
echoes the Hague Convention, in requiring "full and free consent" by the p:trties to a 
marriage. Id. at 106. Recognizing that federalist nations may encounter diffirulties in im· 
plementing the American Convention, the draftsmen limited the obligations of ratif)ing 
nations to the implementation of the Convention with respect to those subjects over 
which the central government possesses "legislative and judicial jurisdiction." Id. at 109. 
23 "Shotgun wedding" denotes those situations in which the pregnancy of the intended 
bride has caused third parties to bring strong pressure to bear upon the father to induce 
him to marry the expectant mother. See generally Wadlington, Slzotgun Marriage by Op. 
eration of Law, 1 GA. L. R.Ev. 183 (1966). 
24 H. CLARK, DoMESTic R:Et.AnoNs § 2.16, at 99·100 (1968). Like other consen.sual rela-
tionships, a marriage contract may be set aside in an action for annulment where it is 
shown that either party entered the marriage as a result of duress. The claim of duress 
is most commonly used by husbands who have been induced to marry by '-arious forms 
of "persuasion" following the seduction of the wife. Howe\·cr, if the "persuasion" does 
not take the form of violence or threats of violence there is no duress. For force, restrainr, 
or threats to constitute duress warranting an annulment or di\·orce, they must be such as 
to overcome the will and bring about a marriage to which consent would not olhend3e 
have been given. See Stakelum v. Terral, 126 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1961) (annulment de· 
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receives no legal recognition as a ground for annulment.25 However 
a number of other countries consider coercion sufficient grounds for 
annulment.26 Arguably, then if the Convention establishes enforceable 
domestic rules, the international understanding of the provisions of the 
Convention would control, with the result that no state would be per-
mitted to deny an annulment where a "shotgun wedding" has taken 
place. 
There are other instances of potential conflict. For example, the Con-
vention expressly provides that marriage shall be lawful only where the 
marriage contract is accompanied by a specified quantum of solemnity. 
In particular, the parties must manifest their consent to their union 
before both a competent authority and witnesses.27 As one commenta· 
tor has observed, the formalities contained in article 1 of the United 
Nations Convention are "indispensable to combat the 'institutions and 
practices' the abolition of which the Convention is intended to bring 
about."28 The same ·writer has forecast difficulty in implementing the 
Convention because of the "continued recognition of so-called common· 
law marriages in some jurisdictions of the United States."29 But coun· 
tervailing public policies in many American states-especially the pol· 
icy against bastardy-demand a mode of marriage without formal 
solemnization. As late as 1922, common-law marriages were recognized 
in more than half of the· states.80 At the present time only fourteen 
states retain the practice.31 Presumably those states which have retained 
nied to husband who had allegedly been forced to give his consent by threats of bodily 
violence or death); Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Tenn. App. 19 (1928) (action for annulment al· 
lowed when threats made by defendant's father). For a critical discussion of this rule, 
see Wadlington, Shotgun Marriage by Operation of Law, supra note 23. For a broad 
treatment of the subject of duress in the marital context, sec Kingsley, Duress as a Ground 
for Annulment of Marriage, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
25 See C. CLAD, H. HALsl':EAD 8: D. CROCKER, FAMILY LAW 131-32 (1964). 
I d. 
The "shotgun marriage" has produced many interesting annulment cases, with most 
of the courts finding that the bridegroom (usually) was unwilling, but not sufficiently 
so under particular sets of facts, especially when the fear might have been attributed 
to possible prosecution rather than the shotgun or other implement of aggression, 
It is interesting that a failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape is viewed 
by the courts as fatal to a claim of force or duress. Mere threats arc not usually 
enough, no matter how imposing the appearance of the outraged relative. 
26 See Schwelb, supra note 1, at 352-54. 
21 U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 1(1), which is set out at note 22 supra. 
28 Schwelb, supra note 1, at 354. 
29 Id. 
80 See 1 C. VERNIER, A.MERlCAN FAMILY LAWs § 26, at 106 (1931). 
31 Common-law marriage is now recognized in Alabama, Colorado, District of Colum· 
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the common-law marriage have done so for reasons considered sound 
and would resist the imposition of a contrary rule by the international 
community • 
. Another.potential point of conflict between the Convention and the 
domestic law of some states lies in the requirement that "due public-
ity" precede the wedding ceremony.82 While few states actually provide 
for banns,33 many require the passage of a specified period of time be-
nveen the issuance of a marriage license and the ceremony.:a Although 
the primary purpose of these waiting periods may be to give the parties 
time to ponder the seriousness of the proposed union, they also provide 
a degree of publicity. Whether they require banns or merely a statutory 
waiting period, most states recognize exemptions from these require-
ments. There are, for example, state statutes waiving publicity in cases 
where "physical condition of either applicant requires the marriage to 
be celebrated without delay,"85 pregnancy,sa or "good and sufficient rea-
son" exists.37 The Convention leaves no room for exemptions of any 
type. Thus American courts might find themselves precluded from ex-
pediting a marriage even in the face of a cause previously thought suffi-
cient to outweigh the need for publicity. sa 
The adoption of the Convention would do more than merely abro-
gate conflicting state policies. It would require a radical redefinition 
bia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyh':Ulia, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina and Texas. Thirty-six states had determined by 1968, either 
by statute or judicial decision, not to recognize common law marriage. For a detailed 
discussion of the present status of the doctrine of common-law marriage, see H. CI..utE, 
DoMESTic RELATIONS § 2.4 (1968). 
32 U.N. Convention on 1\farriage, art. 1(1), set out supra note 22. 
33 E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 53-209 to 210 (1961) (allowing publication of banns to sub· 
stitute for the license); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 89, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (recognizing banns 
in the context of a Quaker wedding). The ecclesiastical requirement was that banns an· 
nouncing the impending marriage were required to be published three times in a public 
place before the marriage was held. See 2 PoLLOCK 8: 1\!Arri..u-"D, HisToRY OF ENcWD LAW 
370 (1898) for a general discussion of banns in ecclesiastical law. 
34 E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:203 (1965) (72 hours required between time of issuance 
of license and performance of marriage ceremony); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5145 (Supp. 
1972) (5 day waiting period must elapse after application !or license filed by town clerk 
before solemnization of marriage). 
85 CoNN. GEN. STATS . .ANN. § 46-5d (Supp. 1972). 
36 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-202 (Supp. 1971). 
37 ANN. IND. STATS. § 44.201(d) (Supp. 1972). 
38 Section 204 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr (1970) does not provide !or 
any exceptions to the waiting period possibly because the period it establishes-three 
days-is relatively short. The complete text of the Uniform Act is contained in l\L PAUL-
SEN 8: W. WADLINGTON, STATUTORY :MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1-88 (1971). 
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of the federal role in family affairs, since article 2 requires each signa· 
tory to "take legislative action to specify a minimum age for marriage."80 
Should such legislation be passed by Congress, the stage would be set 
for a clash between the federal statute and the varying laws of the in· 
dividual states. 
A final point of potential conflict between the Convention and state 
autonomy inheres in article 3 of the Convention which provides for 
registration of all marriages.40 Obviously, article 3 cannot be reconciled 
with the laws of those states which permit common-law marriages. 
Futhermore, there is no constitutional authority in the federal govern· 
ment which would sanction a federally-imposed requirement that the 
states create new or maintain present registration systems. A federal 
registration system would clearly invade the province of the states.41 
Shortly after the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age 
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages was approved by the 
United Nations, the General Assembly adopted the Recommendation 
of Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration 
of Marriages.42 This Recommendation was intended to embrace those 
nations not in a position to ratify the Convention.43 While the Recom· 
mendation does not place such heavy responsibilities on ratifying coun· 
tries as does the Convention, it is less lenient in one respect. The Rec· 
ommendation stipulates a specific age of fifteen years44 under which no 
person shall have capacity to marry. Since several American states pro· 
vide that persons may marry at ages below age fifteen,41l the Recommen· 
39 U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 2; Schwelb, supra note 1, at 883. 
40 Article 8 provides: "All marriages shall be registered in an appropriate official reg· 
ister by competent authority." U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 8; Schwclb, supra note 
1, at 383. 
It should also be noted that article 1(2) of the Convention recognizes proxy marriages. 
It provides that one party may be absent from the wedding if that party ltas consented 
in advance before competent authority to the ceremony being held in absentia. The 
transcript of the Conference proceedings, however, indicates that the article was intended 
to be solely permissive and that no signatory would be obliged to recognize proxy mar• 
riages. Thus, the article would not affect those states which do not allow proxy marriages. 
Schwelb, supra note 1, at 365-71. 
41 Cf. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); In re Burrus, 186 U.S. 1186 
(1890); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 1182 
(1859). 
42 UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27·28 (1968). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 South Carolina provides that the minimum age for marriage is fourteen In the case 
of females and sixteen with respect to males. S.C. CoDE § 20·24 (1962). The South Carolina 
courts, however, have held that marriages contracted by persons below these ages arc not 
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dation would deprive the states of one of their most jealously guarded 
prerogatives-the power to determine the capacity of their citizens to 
marry. 
C. The United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights 
At the present time, the United States has not ratified either the Con-
vention or the Recommendation; nor is the Senate currently consider-
ing ratification. However, the United States is already a party to one in-
ternational undertaking which has implications for family law-the 
United Nations Charter. The United States Supreme Court has inti-
mated that the Charter has the status of a treaty.46 Furthermore, at least 
one state court has relied in part upon the Charter in invalidating a 
state statute prohibiting interracial marriages.47 While the United Na-
tions Charter, itself, may not raise many questions as to the proper 
distribution of powers over domestic relations in tllis area, another pro-
nouncement of the United Nations might-the United Nations Dec-
void if they would have been valid at common law. State v. Ward, 2G-1 S.C. 210, 28 S.E.2d 
785 (1944). By statute in South Carolina, the age requirements may be wah·ed in cases 
of pregnancy. S.C. CoDE § 20-24.5 (Supp. 1970). Sec also VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-48 (1960); 
GA. CODE .ANN. § 53-102 (Supp. 1971). 
46 Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). The case invol\·ed defendant's re-
fusal to bury a Winnebago Indian based on the contract for sale of the burial lot stating. 
"burial privileges accrue ouly to members of the Caucasian race." Id. at 71. Plaintiff 
claimed that this provision 1vas void under both the Iowa and United States Constitu-
tions and that recognition of its validity would violate the fourteenth amendment. Addi-
tionally, plaintiff claimed the provision to be a violation of the United Nations Charter. 
The Iowa Supreme Court, although ruling that the clause was unenforceable as a \'iola-
tion of the Constitutions and public policy of Iowa and the United States, held that the 
clause could be relied on as a defense in an action on the contract and granted defen-
dant's motion to dismiss. The Iowa court likewise held the United Nations Charter ir· 
relevant. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953). The Supreme 
Court affirmed. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). Writ of certiorari l\'llS 
later granted and the earlier Court decision 1vas l'acated as a result of Iowa enacting a 
statute to outlaw defendant's conduct. In discussing the action of the Iowa supreme 
court, Justice Frankfurter stated: 
In addition to the familiar though vexing problems of constitutional law, there l\'35 
reference in the opinions of the Iowa courts and in the briefs of counsel to the United 
Nations Charter. The Iowa courts dismissed summarily the claim that some of the 
general and hortatory language of this Treaty, which so far as the United States is 
concerned is itself an exercise of the treaty-making power under the Constitution, 
constituted a limitation on the rights of the States and of persons othcm·ise reser\·cd 
to them under the Constitution. 
349 U.S. at 73 [emphasis added]. 
47 Perez v. Sharp, 32 CaL 2d 711, 732-33, 198 P.2d 17, 29-30 (19-18) (Carter, J., concur-
ring). Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), declared miscegenation laws \'Oid under the United States Constitution. 
' 
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laration of Human Rights. Regardless of the juridical status of the Dec· 
laration, it may become the foundation of efforts to thrust the federal 
government into the role of promulgator and enforcer of family law. If 
the United States should ever choose to be bound by the Declaration, 
it may simultaneously become obliged to enact legislation affecting the 
domestic relations laws of the states.4s 
One example of a potential conflict with state laws is article 16 of the 
Declaration which states that both parties to a marriage are entitled to 
"equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution."411 
Although there is no authoritative interpretation of this article, it 
would seem to guarantee each spouse equal control and supervision 
over property acquired by either during coverture and to give each a 
right to half of such property upon the termination of the marriage. 
Such an understanding of the property rights of spouses is common out· 
side the United States50 and is consonant with the present law of the 
eight community property states.51 In fact, the proposed Uniform Mar· 
riage and Divorce Act incorporates a concept of marital property quite 
similar to that of community property.52 While the Uniform Act is 
something for each state to consider independently, article 16 may 
someday be advanced by those sympathetic to the Uniform Act as justi· 
fication for bypassing the state legislatures and implementing the pro-
vision at the federal level. 
In a related matter, steps have already been taken to seize upon the 
purported obligations of the United States under the Universal Dec· 
laration and its implementing conventions to thrust the federal gov-
ernment into an area previously left to state regulation. In January 
1971, Congressman Ryan of New York introduced a resolutionlla in the 
House of Representatives proposing that the House express its approval 
48 See note 112 infra. 
49 Covenants on Human Rights art. 16, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, nt 
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
50 See W. DEFUNIAK &: M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 18·18 (2d 
ed. 1971). 
51 The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. J. CRIBBET, W. FRITZ&: C. JonNsoN, CASES AND MA· 
TERIALS oN PROPERTY 186 (1960). Under community property laws generally both spouses 
are entitled to an equal distribution of community property upon divorce or dissolution 
of the marriage. Cf. CAL. CIV. ConE § 4800 (Supp. 1972). 
52 See M. PAULSEN &: "'N. WADLINGTON, STATUTORY :MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, JUpra 
note 38, at 22·23. 
53 H.R. Res. 44, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This point may be moot since the passage 
of the proposed U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXVII, presently subject to ratification by the states. 
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of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. This Convention 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1952 to secure 
to women those rights guaranteed them in several provisions of the 
Universal Declaration.54 ''Women's rights" are outside the scope of this 
Article, but if the traditional power of the states to enact laws under 
their police powers which discriminate, perhaps reasonably in many 
cases, against women are questioned on the basis of the Convention on 
the Political Rights of Women, it is highly probable that the powers of 
the states to ignore international standards relating to marriage and 
other domestic relations 1villlikewise be called intq,question. 
D. Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Recognition of 
Decrees Relating to Adoption 
Marriage is not the only matter of family law which has produced in-
terest among those desiring a uniform system of international private 
law. The Hague Conference has also adopted a Convention on Juris-
diction, Applicable Law, and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adop-
tions.55 Like marriage, adoption has usually been regarded as a state 
matter. Yet, this Convention would impose upon the states obligations 
regarding adoptions which might contravene their present law. The 
provisions of the Convention stipulate circumstances under which all 
parties to the Convention must recognize adoptions and revocations 
and annulments of adoptions granted by the authorities of other con-
tracting nations. The Convention establishes a full faith and credit 
principle for foreign adoptions.56 Thus, if the United States should rat-
ify the Convention, the states would no longer be competent to deter-
mine the wisdom of enforcing foreign adoptions. The Convention does 
recognize the legitimacy of local interest in adoption matters by pro-
viding that, notwithstanding other provisions of the Convention, a 
country might refuse to enforce a foreign judgment if that judgment is 
"manifestly contrary to its public policy."ri7 This concession to public 
54 U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952). This con\·ention is re-
produced in I !NT'L LAw 597·99 (1967). 
55 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Dc:crccs Re-
lating to Adoption (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention on Adoption]. This 
convention is reproduced in 4 lNT'L LEGAL 1\{ATERJALS 338-41 (1965). 
56 Article 8 provides in part: "Every adoption governed by the present Com·ention 
and granted by an authority having jurisdiction under the first paragraph of article S 
shall be recognized without further formality in all contracting St:ltes." Hague Con\'en-
tion.on Adoption, art. 8; 4 INT'L LEGAL l\{AT£RIALS 339. 
57 Article 15 provides: "The provisions of the present Com•cntion may be disreg:mlcd 
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policy does not salvage the traditional powers of the states, however, 
for the public policy intended is that of the ratifying nation, not its 
political subdivisions. Additionally, the construction of the word, "man· 
ifestly," would be determined as a matter of federal or perhaps inter-
national law, so 'that a state would not be free to enforce its public pol· 
icy without regard to federal or international standards. 
This review of efforts in the international community to formulate 
international private law in the field of family law has not touched 
upon all such efforts, for the purpose has been merely to illustrate the 
potential impact of this movement upon the domestic relations law of 
the United States. Ratification of these international agreements could 
produce a profound realignment of the powers of the states and the 
federal governtnent in the regulation of family law matters. There is a 
fundamental question, however, about the constitutional power of the 
federal government to ratify these agreements, for it cannot be lightly 
assumed that the treaty power vests the United States with authority to 
bind the states in family law matters. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE TREATY POWER 
The treaty power is expressly delegated to the federal government 
by the Constitution.Gs Scrutinizing the Constitution as the source of 
this power, one can find no explicit restrictions. Yet, the supremacy 
clause notwithstanding, it is the thesis of this Article that there are in· 
herent in the Constitution and implicit in the nature of the federal sys· 
tem, restrictions which would invalidate ratification of some of the pre-
ceding treaties and other international agreements.r;o 
Thomas Jefferson recorded four limitations on the treaty power in 
his Manual of Parliamentary Practice.60 Two of these are of primary 
in contracting States only when their observance would be manifestly contrary to public 
policy." Hague Convention on Adoption, art. 15; 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS llll!l. 
58 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which is reproduced in note 7 supra. 
50 For discussion of the right of the states to insist upon their constitutional preroga· 
tives notwithstanding a purported renunciation of those prerogatives on thclr behalf by 
the federal government under the treaty-making power, sec note 112 infra. 
60 Jefferson wrote: 
By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legislation is confined 
to two branches only, of the ordinary legislature: the President originating, and the 
Senate having a negative. To what subject this power extends has not been defined 
in detail by the Constitution, nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves. (1) It is 
admitted that it must concern the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it would 
be a mere nullity, res inter alios acta. (2) By the general power to make treaties, the 
Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects which nrc ustt· 
ally regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated. (ll) It must have meant 
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relevance to the present inquiry. The first Secretary of State wrote that 
the power "must have meant to except out .•• the rights reserved to the 
States,"61 doubtlessly alluding to the rights reserved to the states under 
the tenth amendment. While several scholars have suggested that his-
tory has discredited Jefferson on this point,02 the author suspects that 
most American lawyers assume intuitively that family law is an exclu-
sfvely state matter.63 The second relevant limitation on the treaty power 
asserted by Jefferson ·was that only matters normally negotiated among 
nations would be proper subjects of treaties.04 The internal domestic 
concerns of countries seldom become matters for international negotia-
tion. Although cases squarely presenting Jefferson's views have seldom 
arisen, dicta and occasional holdings in Supreme Court opinions sug-
gest that Jefferson was accurately stating implict constitutional restric-
tions on the treaty power. 
A. The Tenth Amendment 
Most basic texts on domestic relations state that federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of family law.011 These sources 
usually cite a handful of old cases as authority for this proposition.ca 
A review of these cases unfortunately discloses that the courts have 
rarely articulated the bases of their holdings. With an equal lack of 
to except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surcly the President 3Jld 
Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole go\•ernment is interdicted from doing 
in any way. (4) And also to except those subjects of legislation in which it gave a 
participation to the House of Representatives. This last exception is denied by some, 
on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. 
The less the better, say others. 
T. JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE (1837), quoted in 5 J. l\{ooRE, Dua:sr 
OF 1Nn:RNATIONAL LAw 162 (1906). 
61 Id. 
62 E.g., Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rig!Jts, supra 
note 6, at 1017 Gefferson's Manual is cited as evidence of its author's "bad guesses'). 
63 For the views of earlier generations of lawyers, which the present \\Titer bclievcs 
are no different from those of today's practitioners, see Wadlington, Divorce Witllout 
Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L REv. 32, 36 (1966): "In addition, under the new fcderol 
constitution, regulation of marriage was considered a matter resen·ed to the indMdual 
states in accord with the tenth amendment." 
64 Item (2) states: "By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must ha\·e 
intended to comprehend only those objects which arc usually regulated by treaty, 3Jld 
cannot be otherwise regulated." T. JEFFERSON, supra note 60. 
65 J. BISHoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION § 155 (1891); H. CLARE, Dom:snc RE-
LATIONs § 11.1, at 286 (1968); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS § 25, at 84 (2d ed. 1970). 
- 66 See note 3 supra. 
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articulated reasoning, the courts have also said that Congress has no 
authority to enact legislation affecting domestic relations matters.07 
1. judicial Authority.-Probably the most widely cited case for the 
proposition that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over divorce 
matters is Barber v. Barber,68 decided by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1859. In this case, a wife, who was a New York resident 
brought suit in federal court against her ex-husband, who resided in 
Wisconsin, to recover alimony arrearage under a New York decree. 
Jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship was subsequently upheld 
by the Supreme Court; however, the Court disclaimed altogether any 
jurisdiction in the federal courts over divorce or for the allowance of 
alimony either as an original proceeding or as an incident to divorce.09 
The basis for this holding is apparent from the dissent where it was 
observed that the English courts at the time .of the transplantation of 
English law to America did not possess jurisdiction over matters of 
divorce and alimony. Since the authority of the courts of the United 
States in equity is limited to that of the English Chancellor, it was rea-
soned, the federal courts also lacked marital jurisdiction.70 
67 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Weinstein, J.). In this 
case Judge Weinstein interpreted the now famous dictum in In re Burrus, 186 U.S. 586 
(1890): 
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child 
belongs to the laws of the United States. 
Id. at 593-94. He stated that "this broad disclaimer refers only to the legislative power of 
the federal government to lay down substantive rules of law in the domestic relations 
area, not to the subject matter jurisdiction-the competence-of the federal courts," 283 
F. Supp. at 804. 
68 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859) (Wayne, J.). 
69 Justice Wayne said: 
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the 
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding 
in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board. 
Id. at 584. 
70 Justice Daniel stated: 
It has been repeatedly ruled by this court that the jurisdiction and practice In the 
courts of the United States in equity are not to be governed by the practice of State 
courts, but that they are to be apprehended and exercised according to the principles 
of equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our 
knowledge of those principles - ••• Now, it is well known that the court of cltnnccry In 
England does not take cognizance of the subject of alimony, but that this is one of 
the subjects within the cognizance of the ecclesiastical court, within whose pccttllar 
jurisdiction marriage and divorce are comprised. Of these matters, the court of 
chancery in England claims no cognizance. Upon questions of settlement or of con· 
tract connected with marriages, the court of chancery will undertake enforcement of 
such contracts, but does not decree alimony as such, and independently of such con· 
tracts. 
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Since 1859 Barber has frequently been cited in support of a constitu-
tionalliniita:tion on the jurisdiction of the federal courts in family law 
cases.71 This interpretation of the case has recently elicited some com-
ment. In the ·case. of Spindel v. Spindel,12 tl1e District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York suggested that Barber was simply a con-
struction of the "statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts 
and not of the Constitution itsel£.78 Jurisdiction in Spindel was based 
on diversity of citizenship. The plaintiff brought a tort action for 
damages -for a fraudulently induced marriage and also sought declara-
tory judgment that her husband's Mexican "quickie" divorce was void. 
The defendant, relying on Barber. moved to dismiss the complaint for 
want of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. The court pointed out that while earlier cases had 
denied affirmative relief in family law cases, the instant case simply 
called for a determination of the validity of an earlier divorce decree.74 
Discolinting the proffered interpretation of Barber, the court denied 
the defense motions and proceeded to adjudicate the claims using the 
substantive law of the state.71i The holding is not really a drastic de-
parture from Barber in view of the fact that Barber itself recognized 
the power of a federal court to enforce a decree already obtained from 
a state court.76 Moreover, since the request for declaratory judgment 
Id. at 604 (Daniel, J., dissenting). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888); Font:lin 
v. Ravena!, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 392-93 (1855). 
'l1 E.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); De L:l Rama \'.De L:l 
Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); Duc:chold v. 
Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Dlank v. Dlank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (W.D. P:~. 
1971). -
72- 283 F. Supp. '197- (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
73 The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) vests in the fcder:U courts power in 
diversity cases to hear "civil actions" and that "civil actions" historically denoted matters 
"of a civil nature at common law or equity." 283 F. Supp. at 802. 
74 A dose reading of Barber indicates that the Supreme Court recognized the differ-
ence between the power to grant a divorce and the power to decide whether a dh·orce 
was valid. It rejected the dissent's position that all aspects of domestic relations were 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts and carefully a\·oided placing a 
blanket prohibition upon the 'exercise of federal jurisdiction in this 3re3. 
283 F. Supp. at 809. 
75 The court found the Mexican divorce invalid under New York law. 283 F. Supp. 
at 813. 
76 Although disclaiming all jurisdiction in the federal courts to grant dh·orces or 
allow alimony, Justice Wayne stated: 
We have already shown, by many authorities, that courts of equity h:l\·e a jurisdiction 
to interfere to enforce a decree for alimony, and by cases decided by this court; that 
the jurisdiction of the courts of equity of the United States is the same as th:&t of 
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was coupled with a claim for damages for fraudulent inducement to 
marriage, the case may be a mere extension of the doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction. 77 
Cases decided since Spindel have produced no innovative results. 
In Williamson v. Williamson,78 the District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma dismissed an action by a wife against her husband 
for an order declaring her the owner of half of the couple's community 
property. In the court's view, a century of unchallenged precedents 
precluded any federal court from becoming a forum for marital com-
bat. 79 Thus, the court concluded that domestic relations are the "sacro· 
sanct preserve of the state courts."8° 
In Buechold v. Ortiz,81 a German national brought suit in federal 
court against a resident of California to establish paternity and obtain 
support for her child. In holding that the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Germany 
did not apply to the case, the court repeated the familiar litany: 
[I]t is well established that the federal courts must decline juris-
diction of cases concerning domestic relations when the primary 
issue concerns the status of parent and child or husband and wife.82 
The court distinguished Spindel on the basis that it was an attack on 
the validity of an existing decree rather than a suit to establish status.83 
In the case of Cain v. King,B4 a federal court adjudicated a suit 
England, whence it is derived. On that score, alone, the jurisdiction of the court in 
the case before us cannot be successfully denied. 
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 592 (1859). See also Vann v. Vann, 294 F. Supp. 
193 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), where the court refused to dismiss a wife's complaint seeking to 
declare void a Tennessee divorce decree obtained by her husband. Citing Spindel, the 
court in Vann held that where a state judgment has been obtained fraudulently and in 
derogation of constitutional rights, the federal courts may hear challenges to the validity 
of the decree. 
"17 Such jurisdiction "exists whenever the state and federal claims 'derive from a 
common nucleus of operative fact' and are such that a plaintiff 'would ordinarily be 
expected to try them all in one proceeding.'" UMW v. Gibbs, 883 U.S. 715 (1966). 
'18 306 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Okla. 1969). 
"19 ''There is no dearth of authority. For more than 100 years in this country, marital 
combatants have sought to make the federal courts their arena. Their attempts have 
been singularly unsuccessful." Id. at 517. 
80 Id. 
81 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968). 
82 Id. at 372. 
8!1 "In reaching our decision we distinguish the recent case of Spindel v. Spindel •• , , 
That was an attack on the validity of a Mexican divorce decree rather than a suit to 
establish status.'' Id. at 374. 
84 313 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. I.a. 1970). 
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brought by a wife to recover· payments due under a settlement agree-
ment incorporated into a state divorce decree. However, the court 
characterized the suit as a simple contract action brought under the 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, rather than a domestic rela-
tions matter. 
It thus appears that despite recent decisions which touch tangentially 
upon domestic relations, most federal courts have been un'\'lilling to 
interject themselves into the milieu of family law. On the other hand, 
the dicta in Barber speaks only to the authority of the federal courts; 
nothing is said about the power of the federal legislature to enact laws 
affecting domestic relations. 
2. Legislatipe Authority.-The most forceful holding on the ques-
tion of federal power to make laws pertaining to domestic relations, as 
well as of the power of the federal courts to hear family law matters, is 
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler.85 This case involved a suit against the 
vice-consul of Rumania for divorce and alimony. The consul's wife 
brought suit in a state court of Ohio, and the consul objected to the 
jurisdiction of that court· on the ground that the Constitution and 
the federal judicial code gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction 
over cases involving ambassadors.86 In a brief opinion for a unanimous 
court, Justice Holmes upheld the state court jurisdiction on the basis 
of his view that the "whole subject" of domestic relations laws be-
longed to the states.87 In support of his decision, Justice Holmes cited 
as "common understanding" at the time the Constitution was adopted 
85 280 U.S. 379 (1930). See also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890), whc:rc Justice Miller 
stated: 
Obviously, although the statutes of the United States ha\'e since enlarged the juris· 
diction of the Circuit Courts by declaring that they shall have original jurisdiction, 
· concurrent With the courtS of the several States, of all civil suits arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their authority, the difliculty is not remo\'ed by this provision, for, as we 
·have already said, the custody and guardianship by the parent of his child does not 
arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States and is not depen· 
dent on them. 
Id. at 595-96. 
86 U.S. CoNsr. art. m, § 2, cl. 1, provides in part: "The judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, • • • to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other publlc 
Ministers and Consuls ••• the Supreme Court shall ha\'e original Jurisdiction." 
The Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 256, 36 Stat. 1161, corresponds in 
substance with 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970) which provides: "The district courts shall ha\·e 
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all actions and proceedings 
against consuls of foreign states." 
87 280 U.S. at 383 (1930). 
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the fact that familial matters were "reserved to the States."88 Justice 
Holmes was clearly not limiting himself to the language of the statutes 
which give the federal courts their jurisdiction; he was defining the 
constitutional limitations of the powers of the federal judiciary and 
legislature. 
·Thus, unlike the Spindel interpretation of Barber, Popovici clearly 
defines constitutional issues. The underlying basis of the Barber· 
Popovici line of cases is the strong conviction on the part of the federal 
bench that the power to deal with domestic relations is reserved to the 
states under the tenth amendment. Chief Justice Taney's eloquent 
opinion in Strader v. Graham89 is expressive of this view. Strader 
involved a suit to recover the value of slaves allegedly spirited outside 
the country by the defendants. The owner of the slaves was residing 
with the slaves in Kentucky at the time of their abduction. The defense 
did not contest the plaintiff's allegations of the basic facts; rather it 
contended that the slaves were freedmen. The defense pointed out that 
sometime earlier the plaintiff had taken the slaves with him into Ohio, 
which, prior to its admission into the Union, had been part of the 
Northwest Territory. This territory was governed by the Ordinance 
of 1787 which provided in part that there should be no slavery nor 
involuntary servitude in the territory except for the punishment of 
crimes follmVing due conviction.90 The defense argued that by opera· 
don of the Ordinance the slaves were emancipated when their owner 
transported them across the Ohio border. The issue before the Court, 
in its simplest terms, was whether the federally enacted law of Ohio or 
the law of Kentucky W'¥l determinative of the status of the slaves. The 
Chief Justice held Kentucky law applicable by observing that while 
the slaves had been taken into Ohio, they voluntarily returned to Ken· 
tucky which was, therefore, their domicile. Chief Justice Taney stated: 
"[E]very State has an undoubted right to determine status, or domestic 
and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its tcrritory."Ol 
The Chief Justice was unable to find any constitutional mandate for 
federal intrusion into the law of Kentucky. 
, Strader clearly holds that the federal government possessed no con· 
stitutional authority to deal ·with domestic relations matters and that 
the sole authority to do so resided with the states. Of course, the thir-
88 Id. at 383·84 (1930). 
89 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850). 
90 Id. at 94. 
91Id. at 93. 
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teenth amendment superseded state laws permitting slavery, but the 
case has clear implications for more than status servi, since the Chief 
justice spoke of the unquestioned right of the states to determine status 
generally. While the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments 
have imposed limitations upon the ways in which states may e.xercise 
their reserved rights, these amendments have not otherwise ousted the 
states from areas of law traditionally reserved to them. In fact, several 
years· after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, a state court 
relied upon Strader in holding that the state of domicile of a married 
person had plenary power to deal ·with his marital status.92 
Strader, its predecessors,93 and its progeny would be meaningless if 
the justices who authored the opinions were not convinced that there 
existed certain subjects over which the federal government has no 
control. Strader expressed this reservation in terms of status. The sub-
sequent case of Andrews v. Andrews94 made it clear that "marital" 
status was included. Massachusetts had refused to recognize the divorce 
which the Andrews had obtained after establishing temporary domicile 
in South Dakota. The full faith and credit clause was urged as a basis 
for compelling . Massachusetts to recognize the judgment of a sister 
92 Hunt v. Hunt. 72 N.Y. 217 (1878). In recent years there bas been considerable 
pressure on the courts to expand the jurisdictional basis upon which stnte courts might 
deal with marital status by shortening the length of residency requirements. E.g., Whot 
v. Wheat. 229 Ar~ 842, 318 S.W .2d 793 (1958) (three months residency was upheld); 
Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954) (a conclush·e stntutory pre-
snmption of domicile upon showing a residence of one year on a militnry resc:n-ation 
or base within the state was upheld); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 850, 820 S.W.2d 807 (1939) 
(a statute granting divorce jurisdiction where one of the parties had resided on a military 
reservation in the state for twelve months was upheld); cf. Gram•ille-Smith v. Gran,·ille· 
Smiili, 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954), afJ'd, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); Alton ''· Alton, 207 F.2d 667 
(3d Cir. 1953); appeal 4ismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1$4). This jurisdictional expansion 
by the states in no way compromises the efficacy of Strader. Such e.-.pansion does not confer 
new powers upon the federal government; rather it would merely recognize greater juris· 
diction in the states. The significance of Strader lies in its holding th:lt the states, not 
the federal government. have the sole authority to deal with questions of status. Fcdc:ral 
law was disregarded in Strader simply because it dealt with a subject which was not 
within the competence of the federal legislature. 
93 Dicta in earlier Supreme Court cases had laid a solid foundation for Strader. In 
1840i ·it was observed that the treaty power could not be exercised in a manner incon-
sistent with "the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of powets between the 
general and state governments." Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840). In 
1847 language to the effect that neither a treaty nor a statute could "a:bitrarily cede 
away any one right of a State" appeared in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 618 
(1847); and almost identical language appeared in an opinion two years later. The Pas· 
senger Cases, 48"U.S.·(7 How.) 282, 507 (1849) • 
. 94 188 u.s. 14 (1903). . . 
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state.95 Rejecting this claim categorically, Justice White stated that "it 
is certain that the Constitution of the United States confers no power 
whatever upon the Government of the United States to regulate mar-
riage in the States or its dissolution."96 This same "hands-off" attitude 
was reiterated recently by Justice Black in Labine v. Vincent.91 This 
case upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which denied 
the status of sole heir at law to an illegitimate child who had been 
acknowledged but never legitimatized by her father. The Louisiana 
law was attacked as violative of equal protection and due process. In 
holding that no such constitutional imperfections were present, Justice 
Black stated: 
[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen 
family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in 
Louisiana by a man dying there is committed by the Constitution 
of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legisla-
ture of that State.9s 
For the last 125 years, therefore, it has been the established rule that 
the regulation of domestic relations is reserved to the states under the 
tenth amendment. The many cases interpreting the full faith and credit 
clause of the Constitution as it relates to divorce and related matters 
attest to the judicially recognized interests of the states in such mat-
ters.99 The power of the states to supervise and regulate family law has 
always been jealously guarded by state and federal judges alike. 
The tenth amendment, by its own terms, reserves to the states only 
those powers which have not been delegated to the federal govern-
ment.100 Some commentators have argued that since the federal 
government is expressly empowered to enter treaties then nothing 
which may be dealt with by treaty is reserved to the states.101 Indeed, 
95 Id. at 18-19. 
96 Id. at 32. 
97 401 u.s. 532 (1971). 
98 Id. at 538. 
99 For a discussion of the full faith and credit clause as it applies to domestic relations, 
see H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 11.2, at 287-89 (1968) and note 16 supra, 
100 U.S. CoNST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively or to the people." 
101 E.g., Hartman, Federalism as a Limitation on the Treaty Power of the United 
States, West Germany, and India, 18 WES. RES. L. REv. 134 (1966). Hartman argues that 
in the conduct of foreign relations the United States possesses plenary power and is not 
limited to the expressly delegated powers. He relies principally upon United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), which held that "the investment 
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Justice Holmes, the author of Popovici, has provided precedent for the 
proposition that the tenth amendment offers no obstacle to the utiliza-
tion of this power. Eight years before Popovici, Justice Holmes wrote 
the opinion in Missouri v. Holland,102 a case which presented the 
Court ·with a clear clash betw·een the tenth amendment and the treaty 
power. In that case, Missouri challenged a federal statute passed to 
implement a treaty be~veen the United States and Great Britain 
dealing with birds which migrated across the border be~veen the 
United States and Canada.103 Basing its claim upon the tenth amend-
ment as well as its asserted common law title to the birds, Missouri 
contended that it alone possessed the power to control the killing and 
sale of these birds. The state argued that the treaty sought to infringe 
upon the interests of the state--interests which the tenth amendment 
reserved to Missouri. In upholding the statute, Justice Holmes made 
some general observations about the nature of the United States 
Government and of the treaty power. He first noted that the tenth 
amendment reserves to the states only those powers which are not dele-
gated by the Constitution to the federal government and that the 
federal government is vested expressly by the Constitution with the 
power to make treaties. Accordingly, he continued, where the treaty 
power has been validly exercised, there can be no derogation of any 
power reserved to the states. Justice Holmes stated that the determina-
tion of whether the treaty power had been lawfully exercised must be 
of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon 
the affirmative grants of the Constitution." Such a position, hoWC\'er, assumes that the 
grant of the treaty power was a grant of unfettered external SO\'ereignty and ignores 
the fundamental bases of a federal system. It is one thing to contend that the trc:lty 
power is not limited to the expressly delegated powers, and quite another to say that 
the treaty power knows no restrictions. Although the most ardent ad\·ocates of an ex-
pansive use of the treaty power concede that powers expressly bestowed on the states by 
the Constitution cannot be overridden by a treaty, this concession is not enough to 
preserve the integrity of the federal system. To state an absurd case, but one quite 
consistent with the view that the treaty power is plenary, the federal go\'ernment could 
by agreem~t with another nation abolish the states almost entirely on the ground that 
a federalist system is too anachronistic in today's world and that foreign relations would 
be improved if state lines were ignored. See also Nathanson, Constitutional Problems In-
volved in Adherence by the United States to a Convention for tlze Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 235, 238-39 (1965) (rhe tenth amend-
ment is dismissed summarily in a brief paragraph entitled "1\fissouri v. Holland and All 
That''). 
102 252 U.S. 416 (1920). A prior statute, unsupported by treaty, had been struck down 
as violative of the tenth amendment. United States v. Shau\·er, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914). 
103 Treaty with Great Britain for Protection of Migratory Birds, August 16, 1916, 89 
Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628. 
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made in light of the nation's entire history. He then considered the 
specifics of the case and concluded that "a national interest of very 
nearly the first magnitude"104 was involved, for without the federal stat· 
ute the birds in question might become extinct. According to Justice 
Holmes, the federal government could not be expected "to sit by while 
a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops 
are destroyed."105 Thus, in balancing the federal interest in protecting 
the birds against the claims of the state of Missouri, he found no viola· 
tion of the tenth amendment. 
Since Missouri v. Holland it has been suggested that there is nothing 
reserved to the states under the tenth amendment which cannot be 
denied them through the treaty power.106 Such a reading of the case 
is unwarranted. Justice Holmes did not hold that any exercise of the 
treaty power could deprive the states of rights otherwise reserved to 
them. Rather, he limited this effect to valid treaties, and he acknowl· 
edged indirectly that the tenth amendment is a material consideration 
in determining the validity of an exercise of the treaty power: 
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words 
to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it 
is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms 
of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country 
has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved.1or 
It is apparent from his language that Justice Holmes did not consider 
the tenth amendment to be irrelevant simply because the treaty power 
had been invoked. His balancing of the relative interests of Missouri 
and of the United States based on his findings of a national interest 
of the "first magnitude" demonstrates that the case might have been 
decided differently had the facts involved matters of more direct con-
cern to the state than migratory birds. Domestic relations are certainly 
of more direct concern to the states than is their title to animals ferae 
naturae. Justice Holmes himself recognized this elementary distinction 
eight years after Missouri v. Holland when he penned the Popovici 
104 252 U.S. at 435. 
105 Id. It should also be noted that the birds migrated across an international boundary 
and that a valid "international concern" was, therefore, present. 
106 See, e.g., Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra 
note 6; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Lancl ancl 
Foreign Relations, supra note 6. However, in both articles, the author primarily cmpha· 
sizes the growing role of treaties in the international community to support his theory. 
101 252 U.S. at 433-34. 
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opinion. Balancing the national interest in the protection of foreign 
diplomats against a state's interest in the marriage of one of her citi-
zens, he found the latter controlling, and accordingly, upheld the juris-
diction of the courts of Ohio over the divorce action.108 
The patent distinction between Missouri v. Holland and Popovici 
is that the latter did not concern the construction of a treaty. It is sub-
mitted, however, that constitutional and statutory guarantees of federal 
forums for foreign diplomats are no less "the supreme law of the land" 
than are treaties or other international agreements. Clearly Justice 
Holmes did not intend Missouri v. Holland to have the sweeping scope 
that some latter-day scholars would attribute to it.10D 
This comparison of Missouri v. Holland and Popovici emphasizes 
that the scope of the treaty power cannot ·be determined in a given 
case ·without consideration of the legitimacy of the inherent interests 
of- the states in the subject-matter of the treaty.uo The traditional 
interests of the states in regulating family law matters must be given 
great weight in reaching that determination. These interests have 
already been recognized by one American representative at an interna-
tional conference considering international agreements on family law. 
The United States representative signed the 1962 Convention of Con-
sent to marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages only after stating that while the United States itself could 
agree to be bound by the Convention, its ratification of the Convention 
could impose no responsibilities upon the states.m This attempt to 
limit the participation of the United States in this Convention may not 
comport with a rule of international law that a nation which has rati-
fied a treaty will not be excused from the performance of its obligations 
under the treaty merely because it has not observed its own constitu-
tionallimitations.112 This rule of international law would render the 
lOS Justice Holmes wrote that "the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent 
and child were matters reserved to the States •••• " Ohio ex rt:l. Popo\•ici \', Agler, 280 
U.S. 379, 384 (1930). [emphasis added]. See notes 85-88 supra and accomp:m)ing text. 
109 See note 106 supra. 
uo Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942): "It is, of course, true that C\·en 
treaties with friendly nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the 
authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to cll'ectuate 
the national policy." Even those who find in Missouri v. Holland a negation of the 
reserved rights of the states where a treaty is present usually balance the respecti\·e 
federal and state interests. Thus, Professor Hartman concludes that "when local matters 
themselves extend into the affairs of natious so that international cooperation is required, 
they become proper subjects of treaties." Hartman, supra note 101, at 149. 
1U U.N. Doc. AJPV 1167, at 33-35 (1962). See note I supra for the text of his statement. 
112 See J. HENDRY• TREATIES AND FEDERAL CoNmTU110NS 187-62 (1955). There is a 
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federal government answerable in the international community for a 
subsequent failure to enforce the treaty in the states, but it would not 
remove the constitutional disabilities of the federal government. Yet 
whatever the rule of international law may be, it cannot confer extra-
constitutional powers upon the United States. 
B. Proper Subjects For International Agreements 
The treaty power is properly exercised only where the subject-matter 
addressed is one of "international concern."113 Thus, it cannot be in· 
voked to deal with the purely internal concerns of a nation. This rule, 
like the limitation placing the reserved powers of the states beyond the 
reach of treaties, was first articulated by Thomas Jefferson.114 In ex-
pressing the opinion that a treaty "must concern the foreign nation, 
party to the contract, or it would be a mere nullity ... ,"111i Jefferson 
continuing debate among students of international law as to the enforceability of treaty 
obligations assumed by a nation in violation of its internal constitutional law. On the 
one ltand, the monists regard such treaties as unenforceable, holding that internal law is 
part and parcel of international law. The dualists, on the other hand, argue that inter• 
national law exists independently of the internal sphere. The United Nations Conference 
on the Law of Treaties has formulated a middle position, namely, that the treaties arc 
enforceable unless the violation of internal law is "manifest." Kearney, Internal Limitations 
on External Commitments-Article 46 of the Treaties Convention, 4 lNT'L LAw. 1, 8 
(1969); see Hague Convention on Adoption, art. 15 (set out in note 57 supra). Since the 
present Article addresses itself to the enforceability of treaties under the supremacy clause 
of the Constitution, considerations of the operation of treaties under international law 
per se are irrelevant. 
113 A clear statement of this limitation relates back to the now famous remarks made 
in 1929 by Charles Evans Hughes, former Secretary of State and already designated Chief 
Justice of the United States. Mr. Hughes remarked: 
I should not care to voice any opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty· 
making power. The Supreme Court has expressed doubt whether there could be 
any suclt. That has been expressed in one of its opinions. But if there is a limltatioh 
to be implied, I should say it might be found in the nature of the treaty making 
power. 
It [the treaty·making power] is not a power to be exercised, it may be assumed, 
with respect to matters that have no relation to international concerns. 
But if we attempted to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters whiclt 
did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters whiclt normally 
and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the States, then I again 
say there might be ground for implying a limitation upon the treaty·making power 
that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs 
and not to make laws for the people of the United States in their internal concerns 
through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making power. 
23 Pnoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 194, 195-96 (1929). 
114 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 60. 
115 Id. 
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was apparently suggesting that only foreign or international affairs 
could be legitimate subjects of a treaty. He was also asserting that any 
nation with which the United States attempts to deal by treaty must 
have some bona fide interest in the subject matter of the treaty. These 
limitations would preclude, for instance, an attempt by the federal 
government to resolve purely domestic matters which concern no other 
nation by concluding a mock. treaty.116 
Fortunately, the United States has never sought to utilize the treaty 
power to dispose of a purely domestic concern.U7 This disinclination 
has resulted in a dearth of case law involving the international con-
cern limitation. Proponents of international uniformity of private law 
have seized upon this fact to argue that since no court has relied upon 
the international concern requirement to invalidate a treaty. the rule 
must not exist.118 However, this argument flaunts dicta in the opinions 
of the Supreme Court.119 Moreover. in most of the cases in which the 
rule might have been operative. the Court has found matters of inter-
national concern so that there has been little opportunity to apply the 
rule.12o 
116 Professor Henkin, an eloquent advocate of United States mtific::1tion of hum:m 
rights conventions, concedes the impropriety of a mock or sham tre:lty. Henkin, "Inter-
national Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63 AM. J. OF I:.'T'L L 272, 
274 (1969). 
117 The Supreme Court has never been asked to consider a treaty lacking "'obvious 
connection with a matter of international concern.'" Power Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 
538, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n \'. Power 
Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). 
118 Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra 
note 6, at 1031-32. 
119 See, e.g .• Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (''all subjects that properly 
pertain to our foreign relations"); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (''all proper 
subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations'1: Holden v. Joy, 84 
U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) ("all those objects which in the intercourse of nations lud 
usually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and tre:ltf1· 
120 See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) (''tre:lty power of the United 
States extends to all proper subject of negotiation between our government and the 
governments of other nations'1: Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 PeL) 540, 569 (1840) 
("power to make treaties ••• was designed to include all those subjects, which, in the 
ordinary course of nations, had usually been made subjects of negotiation and tre:lty'1: 
cf. 1\fissouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In rejecting the state's argument that it had 
exclusive title to the migratory birds covered by the treaty, the Court in Missouri v. 
Holland upheld the statute enacted pursuant to the treaty and Justice Holmes sl:ited: 
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is invoh·ed. It can be 
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject 
matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent lubitat therein. 
But for the treaty and statute there soon might be no birds Cor any powers to deal 
with. 
Id. at 435. 
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For example, in Geofroy v. Riggs121 the right of an alien to inherit 
property was recognized by treaty, but not by local law. In upholding 
the treaty, Justice Field made an expressed finding of international 
concern.122 Hence, the treaty satisfied the international concern limita-
tion. 
Despite the paucity of direct authority, the international concern 
limitation has been adopted by the American Law Institute's Restate· 
ment of the Law of American Foreign Relations.123 However, this rule 
has been challenged by some modern scholars124 who would deem a 
matter to be of international concern by the mere fact that it ·was 
incorporated into a treaty. Thus, one ·writer has reasoned that "if 
the status of human rights in the United States are deemed to require 
regulation in the interest of United States foreign relations, Congress 
has the power to deal with them."125 While the writer was commenting 
upon the power to conduct foreign relations, his remarks have equal 
relevance to the treaty power. Certainly human rights could under 
121 133 u.s. 258 (1890). 
122 I d. at 266·67. He said that treaties extend to "all proper subjects of negotiation 
between our government and the governments of other nations." Id. at 266, 
123 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REI.AnONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 11'7 (1965) 
provides in part: 
(I) The United States has the power under the Constitution to make international 
agreements if 
(a) the matter is of international concern, and 
(b) the agreement does not contravene any of the limitations of the Constitution 
applicable to all powers of the United States. 
124 E.g., Dorsey, supra note 6, at 22'7. Professor Dorsey attributes the "international 
concern" restriction to Charles Evans Hughes' remarks at the 1929 annual meeting of the 
American Society of International Law in which Hughes expressed the view that there 
are implied limitations in the nature of the treaty power itself. 23 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L 
L. 194, 195·96 (1929). These remarks are set out in note 113 supra. Professor Henkin 
minimizes the significance of Hughes' remarks by observing that they were "extempora· 
neous, perhaps even impromptu, not a carefully prepared statement of constitutional 
doctrine." Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra 
note 6, at 1023. Nonetheless, Hughes' remarks have received judicial approval. Sec Power 
Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot sub nom. American Pub. 
Power Ass'n v. Power Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (195'7). In Power Authority, the court of 
appeals expressly noted that Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), has not defined tlte 
constitutional limits of the treaty power. 247 F.2d at 542. Sec generally Gardner, A 
Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907 (1967); Henkin, supra note 116; Tuttle, Arc tl1c 
"Human Rights" Conventions Really Objectionable1 3 INT'L LAw. 885 (1969). 
125 Henkin, The Treaty Maker and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign 
Relations, supra note 6, at 922. Professor Henkin also has written: "I am confident that, 
if the Supreme Court ever faced the question, it would not find any special requirement 
of 'international concern', if that is interpreted to exclude some subjects from international 
negotiation by the United States." Henkin, supra note 116, at 2'1'7. 
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some circumstances become matters of international concern, but such 
instances are likely to be extremely rare, especially when they relate to 
family law matters. If it were ever recognized that any matter incorpo-
rated into a treaty would henceforth be considered of international con-
cern, the authority of the federal government to preempt the states 
from the exercise of their law-making power in any given area of law 
would be virtually unlimited. 
This is not to say, however, that those subjects which traditionally 
have been regarded as purely domestic concerns can never be dealt 
with by international agreement. The changing complexion of the 
world has made it increasingly likely that heretofore internal affairs 
·will have foreign implications. This may be even true-at least occasion-
ally-'with respect to matters of family law. Marriages benveen persons 
of different nationalities are more common today than in past eras, and 
natioi.ts may well have an interest in protecting their nationals who 
enter into such marriages. Adoptions and divorces also can involve 
pe~ons of diverse nationality.126 To the extent that a nation acts to 
protect its own citizens by iriternational agreement, that nation is 
pii~ting its treaty powers to proper use. Historically, treaties have been 
used to secure international respect for the rights of citizens of the 
~ontracting nations. Concomitantly, a nation which ratifies a treaty 
designed to protect its citizens has an interest in the subject matter of 
the treaty, since nations are responsible for the welfare of their na-
tionals and must, therefore, be regarded as interested parties. 
Thus, to the extent that its nationals are affected by the terms of a 
particular treaty, a nation may legitimately view those terms as relating 
to a matter of international concern. Many of the provisions of the 
international agreements presently under consideration, however, pur-
port to <!eal in a sweeping fashion with family law matters. The 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages, for example, provides that parties, 
126 One supporter of the "international concern" limitation bases his beUef th:it hum:m 
rignts generally are improper subjects for a treaty upon the conviction th:it treaties em 
be viable only insofar as there is a realistic expectation th:it they will achieve their 
objectives. He concludes that unleis treaty provisions are sufiidently explicit to confer 
specific benefits upon the parties, it is unrealistic to expect "efi'ecti\·e international coop-
erative and reciprocal actions" to follow. Dorsey, supra note 6, at 227. He argues th:it 
"[b]y the test of realism ••• the previously internal matters of political, economic, and 
social rights of nationals of developed states inter se within their own territories remain 
entirely internal, and are1lot appropriate subjects for the exercise of the treaty power." 
Id. at 220. 
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shall not be competent to marry unless they have attained the age of 
fi£teen.127 This restriction pertains to every marriage, not merely those 
betw·een persons of different nationalities. It may be inferred, therefore, 
that the signatories are not motivated merely by a desire to protect 
their own citizens from imprudent marriages; rather, they are seeking 
to establish humane or perhaps merely uniform standards throughout 
the world. Such motives may well be laudable in themselves, but the 
fact remains that the contracting nations are attempting to influence 
transactions in which they have no real interest. The incidence of bi-
national marriages is so insignificant that the resolution of problems 
concerning them ought not to be achieved by the promulgation of a 
rule which encompasses all marriages. If the international community 
perceives a need to regulate the bi-national marriage, it should act 
specifically.128 
Until a nation demonstrates that it is affected by the internal affairs 
of another nation, it has no standing to exert an influence upon the 
internal laws of that other nation. The constitutional history of the 
United States suggests that the treaty power was never envisioned as 
a vehicle to give foreign nations a voice in the legislative processes of 
this country; indeed, few would deny that at the time of the adoption 
of the Constitution the states were extremely jealous of their preroga-
tives. While it is true that the Articles of Confederation demonstrated 
that too much decentralization produces an anemic government, it is 
equally true that only certain powers were bestowed upon the federal 
government in the Constitution. Since the founding fathers intended 
to invest the national government with only a certain quantum of 
authority, it is unlikely that they meant the treaty power to be plenary. 
Without restrictions upon the treaty power, there would be no limi-
tations upon the federal government except for those powers expressly 
denied it in the Constitution. The federal government would be trans-
formed into one of general rather than of delegated authority. In light 
127 See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text. 
128 Cf. Annex 1 to the Note Verbale of the Embassy of the United States of America 
dated August 3, 1959 (concerning the Status of Forces Agreement between the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany), where the United States agreed to assist 
German authorities in serving process upon American servicemen named in paternity 
actions and to serve any judgment rendered by a German court in such suits. This 
supplementary agreement illustrates that with the American military presence in Europe, 
some family law matters can assume international significance. Note, however, that the 
agreement does not undertake the enforcement of the German decrees in the United 
States. 
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of the motives of the draftsmen of the Constitution, common sense 
dictates that the treaty power be confined to such matters as are neces-
sary for the functioning of the national government in the interna-
tional community.129 The treaty power was designed to enable the 
federal government to deal ·with foreign nations in matters which 
legitimately affect those nations; it ·was not intended to subject this 
country to the whims of other nations over matters which do not affect 
them. This traditional view of the treaty power explains why the 
United States has not used the power to dispose of internal concerns. 
The proposed international agreements relating to family law call for 
a novel utilization of the treaty power, for they would obligate the 
United States with respect to matters which do not affect any other 
nation or nationals of any other nation. 
The conditions for marriage in the several states are of little concern 
to other nations. It should make little difference to the countries which 
have signed the Convention of Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age 
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages that some American states 
make twenty-one the age of consent while others make it eighteen. Nor, 
indeed, should other nations complain that a few states allow their 
citizens to marry at fourteen years of age. Perhaps, the sensibilities of 
the peoples of other nations are offended by the existence of common-
law marriages in some of the states of the United States. However, their 
displeasure surely does not give them the power to join with the federal 
government in changing those laws. It was to preclude just such inter-
meddling that Thomas Jefferson stated that a treaty must "concern 
the other nation" and deal with subjects usually dealt '\'lith by treaty. 
It is difficult to conceive of an area of the law which is more re-
stricted to the geographical boundaries of a nation than laws relating 
to domestic relations. Only in rare instances do family law matters 
129 Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). It is true that in Pink a tTcaty was 
held to prevail over an inconsistent state law, but the other party to the tTcaty, Russia, 
had a clearly demonstrable interest in the subject matter of the tTcaty, for the foOlS of 
the controversy was the right of Russia to property claims that it had assigned to the 
United States. Professor Chafee attempts to justify tTcaties relating solely to internal 
affairs on the grounds that what happens within one nation may affect affairs in another 
and that displeasure with another nation's internal policies may prompt one nation 
to resort to war. Chafee, Federal and State Powers Under the U.N. Conventions on Human 
Rights, 1951 Wis. L ru:v. 389, 468-73 (1951). 'While such considerations may ha\'e limited 
validity in conjunction with certain international agreements, it is inconceh-able that 
they could assume significance in family Jaw matters. It is difficult to foresee any efi'ect, 
direct or indirect, that American family Jaw might ha\'e upon either the domestic life 
or the international affairs of another country. 
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acquire international significance. Thus, in examining the proposed 
conventions and other agreements relating to family law, it is essential 
that the interests of the contracting nations in the subject matter of the 
agreements be explored. If the other countries are simply attempting 
to compel the United States to adopt family law rules which are accept· 
able to them but in which they have no interest, the agreement should 
not be ratified by the United States. On the other hand, the sole fact 
that the international agreement in question relates to domestic rela· 
tions does not ipso facto remove the subject matter from legitimate 
international interest. In each instance the competing interests of the 
several states and the international community should be weighed. 
The international concern limitation expounded in this section of 
this Article must be read in conjunction with the tenth amendment 
limitation, although it may in some cases be less restrictive than the 
restraints of the tenth amendment. For example, the recognition of 
foreign divorce decrees may well be of international concern, but per· 
haps the enforcement of such decrees is a matter reserved to the states 
under the tenth amendment, at least as they relate to domiciliaries of 
the states. The amendment certainly poses a more serious obstacle to 
the ratification of international agreements concerning domestic rela· 
tions than does the requirement of international concern. This is 
primarily because the requirement for international concern has re· 
ceived less attention from the courts due perhaps to the fact that the 
amendment explicitly reserves certain powers to the states while the 
requirement for international concern is merely implicit in the Consti· 
tution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the treaty power may be one of the most all-encompassing 
of the powers conferred upon the United States by the Constitution, 
it is not without limitations. This Article has explored these limitations 
in relation to the area of domestic relations. A review of over a century 
of case law has demonstrated that any attempt to invoke the treaty 
power as a basis for federal promulgation of family law rules will fail, 
since only in rare instances could such attempts relate to proper mat-
ters of international concern; and, even if international concerns were 
involved, the interests of the states, as those interests are preserved by 
the tenth amendment, would undoubtedly outweigh those of the 
federal government. 
